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Cerro Cumbray wasn’t the first site I would’ve chosen. It doesn’t have grand 
fortifications, or much standing architecture of any kind. Nevertheless, when illness derailed my 
initial research plans, I resigned myself to it. 
The ceramics scattered across the ground are, for the most part, utilitarian wares. Rather 
than the complex and beautifully decorated ceramics I’d seen in museums, I was met with a 
collection of red, brown, and black earthenwares unremarkable in both form and decoration. I 
wasn’t immediately thrilled. 
 However, the more I looked, the more the little site had me hooked. Little hints kept 
popping up: the distribution of certain types of rim sherds, the one intact seashell, the tiny pile of 
slingstones. Each added a tiny piece to the puzzle. 
 That puzzle is far from complete. Nevertheless, the following chapters represent my best 
understanding of the way that the people of Cerro Cumbray lived. 
Likewise, I wanted to understand the world that Cerro Cumbray sat in the middle of. 
Cerro Cumbray, like many other sites in the Upper Moche and Sinsicap Valleys, sits on a 
precipice. Dividing coastal and highland populations, these seemingly inconsequential hilltop 









 In order to understand how the residents of Cerro Cumbray participated in a contest 
between the Chimú and Inka Empires, it is first necessary to understand the playing field. As 
such, Chapter One focuses on the ecology and prehistory of the Moche Valley. 
 Chapter Two introduces the two empires. The Chimú Empire is discussed from the 
perspective both of its capital city as well as its territorial expansion. The Inka Empire is 
examined through an archaeological and ethnohistoric lens. A particular focus is placed on the 
ways that the Inka incorporated territory both diplomatically and violently, and what that implies 
for the conquest of the Chimú. This chapter forms the basis for later discussions of coastal 
highland interaction, using GIS techniques to supplement the historical and archaeological 
record. 
 Chapter Three initially discusses the problems and opportunities involved with 
identifying prehistoric fortifications. Later, two different perspectives on Andean fortifications 
are presented. Both sides are used as a critical lens to examine the extent to which Cerro 
Cumbray was simultaneously fortified and accessible. The defensive characteristics discussed by 
Keeley et. al, Arkush and Stannish, and Topic and Topic as well as Cerro Cumbray’s naturally 
defensive position are synthesized in Chapter Four. 
 Chapter Four presents an in depth discussion of the survey of Cerro Cumbray. First, the 
two distinct methods and process used to survey the site are established. Firstly, a systematic 
pedestrian survey was performed that resulted in the collection of large amounts of ceramic data. 
Aerial drone photography was used to produce an orthophoto and digital elevation of the site for 
further analysis. When a synthesis of the data is presented, each line of evidence is used to 
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support and corroborate the other. The presentation of ceramic and other artifactual data over the 
drone based imagery allows for easy analysis and a better understanding of the spatial divisions 
at the site. 
 At a larger scale, Chapter Five discusses the use of GIS techniques to analyze Cerro 
Cumbray’s place on the landscape. A sequence of three highland sites are presented as likely 
jumping off points for an invasion of the coast. A least cost path is derived using a DEM of the 
region from each point to Chan Chan, the Chimu capital. Each path is then analyzed with regards 
to its intersection or overlap with regards to three distinct viewsheds from the summit of Cerro 
Cumbray. The chapter concludes with a speculative discussion of Cumbray’s place in the Chimú 
network. 
 Chapter Six briefly synthesizes and presents the conclusions from the previous five 
chapters and presents my final thoughts on the project. Chapter six concludes with a reflection on 












Chapter One – The Lay of the Land 
Moche Valley Ecology 
 
The Moche Valley is much like many of the other river valleys on the coast of Peru. It is 
visible on modern satellite imagery as a thin ribbon of green that cuts through an arid coastal 
desert. The valley also serves as a connection between the productive fisheries of the coast and 
the agriculturally limited zones of the cold highlands. Connecting these two distinct extremes are 
a vertical sequence of 8 “natural regions”, first named by Vidal (1990). From roughly east to 
west these regions are: the Chala or coast(0-500m), the Yunga (500-2300m), the Quechua (2300-
3500m), the Suni (3500-4000m), the Puna (4000-4800m), the Janca or Cordillera (4800-
6768m), the Selva Alta (400-1000m), and the Selva Baja (80-400m). While these zones were all 
codependently linked in Andean prehistory, this paper will focus on the zones most crucial to the 




Figure 1. A visualization of Vidal's ecological zones. From Zimmerer and Bell 2013. 
 
 The coast refers to the region bounded by the Pacific ocean and the foothills of the Andes 
that ranges from 0 to approximately 500 meters in elevation. The coast is dominated by a 
seeming dichotomy between the rich marine fisheries of the Humboldt current and the arid desert 
outside the narrow river valleys. As a result, coastal populations developed subsistence systems 
focused on a combination of marine resources and sophisticated irrigation farming.  
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As such, the Coast has historically been especially susceptible to ENSO (El Niño 
Southern Oscillation) events. These large scale climatic events occur when Pacific ocean 
currents reverse, and warm equatorial waters flow south down the usually frigid pacific coast of 
South America. As a result, large scale die-offs of marine fish occur as water temperatures 
exceed their survival threshold. On land, the normally arid desert is inundated by torrential rains. 
This in turn leads to catastrophic flooding damage and loss of agricultural infrastructure.  Recent 
archaeological research has examined the relationship that the peoples of Peru’s prehistoric coast 
had with ENSO events, and how they accommodated these apocalyptic events into their 
cosmovision (Prieto et al. 2019). 
 These effects were not, however, limited to the coast. Further up the river valleys the 
yunga zone emerges. Located between 500 and 2300 meters in elevation, and with more fertile 
soils than the arid coast, the yunga provides a prime site for agricultural production. Production 
is most intense in the narrow chaupiyunga band, a zone between 800-1200m. Here the 
microclimate is particularly suited to the production of coca and maize. Both were coveted 
resources in Andean prehistory. Coca was prized for its stimulating effects, while maize was 
highly valued for its ability to be fermented into chicha, an alcoholic maize beer. The coca from 
the western chaupiyunga was especially prized for its sweeter taste in comparison to coca grown 
in the ceja de la montaña on the eastern slopes of the Andes (Malpass 2016: 21).  
In this zone El Niño events can cause devastating rainfall, but the ensuing moisture also 
periodically turns the desert into perfect pasture for camelid herds. As a result of these 
properties, the yunga was highly contested in Andean prehistory with coastal and highland 
polities jockeying for control of its resources. Cerro Cumbray is located on the low margin of 
this important economic zone. 
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 Above the yunga zone, the quechua emerges. While this zone lies outside the immediate 
survey area, it is nevertheless important to mention it in regards to highland polities. Located 
between 2300-3500 meters, the quechua zone produces a substantial amount of maize. In the 
Late Horizon, this maize was collected by the Inka Empire along with potatoes grown at higher 
altitudes and put into state storehouses. It was also used to produce large amounts of chicha. It 
was only through the large scale production of maize and that Inka military forces and corvée 
labor divisions could be provisioned. The quechua zone is relevant to this thesis in that the late 
horizon fortified sites identified by Coupland serve to mark the zones lower boundary. 
 While not especially relevant to the focus of this thesis, the upper zones of the Suni, 
Puna, and Cordillera are worth a brief mention. They were, respectively, focal points of: potatoes 
and high altitude grains such as quinoa, pasture for grazing camelids, and the spiritually 
significant snow covered mountain peaks of the high Andes. The selva alta and selva baja refer 
to higher and lower zones of moist forest on the east slopes of the Andes, bordering the amazon 
basin. 
Each of these vertical zones are important in Andean prehistory. In his influential work 
on the Inka empire, John Murra (1980) termed the connections between populations at different 
elevations “vertical archipelagos.” He saw these vertical ecological zones as being 
complementary in many ways, each producing goods necessary to the other regions. Zones 
which produced especially important goods used for ritual or conspicuous consumption were 
zones of increased conflict. In terms of this study, the most important resources were coca, 
produced in the Chaupiyunga and maize produced in the Quechua (Boswell 2016). It’s likely that 
competition over control of these resources represents an impetus for at least some of the site 
construction in the survey area. 
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Prehistoric Sequence of the Moche Valley  
 The prehistory of Andean South America is divided into a sequence of Horizons and 
Intermediate Periods. Each horizon represents a time period where a certain culture seems to 
have established widespread popularity or dominance. Each period, conversely, represents a 
temporal division wherein Andean societies were more regionally or locally focused and thus 
exhibit greater variation. This system was codified into the 
Rowe-Menzel system. The Rowe-Menzel system divides 
Andean prehistory into eight general phases, which can be made 
more specific for the region of interest. 
 
 Humans first inhabited the continent of south America 
sometime after the end of the last ice age. This initial period is 
termed the “lithic” after the fluted projectile points that appear 
in both North and South America. Evidence from the site of 
Monte Verde suggests that humans had reached the southern tip 
of South America by approximately 13,000 years BP (Moseley 
2001). Andean peoples of the Lithic period were sustained 
mostly by hunting and gathering (in the highlands) or by fishing 
and the collection of marine resources (on the coast).  
 The next period is defined more by climatic change than 
by cultural shift. The Preceramic, which follows the lithic, is 
defined as coinciding with the end of glacial melting. When the 
Figure 2. A partial chronological 
sequence for the Moche Valley and 
Andes at large. The focus of this 
thesis is marked by the red 
rectangle. From Boswell 2016. 
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climate entered its current pattern, approximately 5,000 years ago, sea levels and weather 
patterns stabilized. Populations became increasingly sedentary (Moseley 2001). Evidence of 
simple agriculture in the Moche Valley dates back to the Late Preceramic, prior to the 
intensification of irrigation (Billman 2002). As the name would suggest, this period ends with the 
introduction of pottery approximately 1800 BCE.  
 The initial period, beginning in 1800 BC is primarily associated with the widespread 
adoption of irrigation agriculture (Moseley 2001). On a local level, the initial period coincides 
with the beginning of the Guañape Phase in the Moche Valley. At this time, a significant 
population shift occurred with coastal populations settling in the valley to take advantage of 
irrigable land (Billman 2002).  
 By 400 BC, the Guañape Phase in the Moche Valley was giving way to the Salinar Phase. 
This phase was characterized by continuing irrigation development and by the end of the period 
virtually all the irrigable land in the valley had been developed (Billman 2002). Food production 
increased and consequently population expanded significantly. Settlements often shifted to more 
defensive locations, and the first fortifications in the Moche Valley emerged (Mullins 2012).  
 The Salinar Phase was followed by the Gallinazo Phase, in which one site came to 
dominate the lower valley and monumental architecture was revived. Further up the valley, 
highland settlements emerged that may represent increased highland migration into the valley. 
This increased migration may well have led to tension, and these settlements may represent the 
beginnings of violent highland-coastal conflict in the Moche Valley (Mullins 2012; Billman 
2002). Further investigation is needed to clarify the exact relationships between highland and 
coastal populations in the Gallinazo period. The Gallinazo Phase ends with the beginning of the 
Moche phase. 
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 The Moche period is perhaps the best known period of the north coast cultural sequence.  
Moche public architecture is remarkably consistent across the region, showing a similar color 
palette and a planned architectural schema. These sites were also the locations of carefully 
choreographed human sacrifice events. Initially, it was believed that the sacrifices were losers in 
ritual combat between Moche elites. More recent bioarchaeological investigation has uncovered 
strong evidence that Moche sacrificial victims were prisoners taken in territorial conflict with 
highland populations (Sutter and Verano 2006).  
While there is little evidence of fortification in the Moche Phase, this territorial warfare 
can be supported by the contemporary abandonment of many local highland communities 
(Billman 2002).  
The Southern Moche State declined sometime between 750 and 900 CE, likely due to 
climatic events which weakened the prestige of the ruling class and destabilized subsistence 
systems. Between 900 and 1000 CE, there was little central political organization in the Moche 
Valley. A hierarchical state reemerges during the Late Intermediate Period in the form of the 
Chimú Empire. The Chimú Empire, and their highland rivals the Inka will be discussed in further 








Chapter Two – Arch Rivals 
The Chimú: Foundations and Capital 
 Beginning sometime around 1000 CE, the Chimú Empire emerged on the north coast of 
Peru. Following Rowe’s Andean chronology, the formation of the Chimú Empire coincides with 
the beginning of the Late Intermediate Period (LIP). At a smaller scale, the Chimú chronology is 
divide into Early Chimú (approximately 900-1000AD) and Middle/Late Chimú (1000 AD to 
Inka conquest around 1470). These stages are useful in considering the process that transformed 
the Chimú Empire from a local power to a territorial empire. 
 The initial seed of this power was rooted at the site of Chan Chan. Located on the coast 
just outside the modern city of Trujillo, Chan Chan became the seat of political power in the 
Moche Valley a brief time after the demise of Gallindo, the last vestige of Moche power in the 
valley. Some have even argued that populations from Gallindo where involved in the initial 
construction phases at Chan Chan, citing architectural similarities between Galindo and the 
initial phase of construction at Chan Chan (Kolata 1982). As time passed, further architectural 
developments were made in a uniquely Chimú style. 
 Among the unique architectural features of the city’s urban center are: temples known as 
huacas, palatial buildings known as ciudadelas, and U shaped plazas known as audiencias. Each 
represents a vital arm of political control. Residential structures can be divided into two main 
categories: elite residential structures proximal to the ciudadelas, and lower class residences 
known as SIAR (small irregularly agglutinated rooms) which are located near certain ciudadelas 
as well as around the outskirts of the city (J. Topic 1982). While these structural types are all 
spatially and temporally interrelated, it is necessary to discuss each in turn in order to then 
attempt a synthesized understanding of the way that Chan Chan functioned as a whole. 
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Chan Chan: Monumental Architecture 
 Chan Chan has four named huacas, most of which lie further from the center of the city 
than the ciudadelas and audiencias. In the case of Chan Chan, the huacas are large adobe terraced 
mound structures. While the archaeological investigation of the huacas has been limited due to 
extensive looting during the colonial period, it can be generally observed that the size of the 
huaca structures decreases through time (Moore 1996: 85). This may be a result of the increasing 
relative power of the ciudadela complexes. 
 There are nine definitive ciudadelas at Chan Chan, with a tenth enclosure known as Tello 
falling outside the normal schema. All are rectangular and roughly oriented along a north south 
axis. Size range from 88,790 m2  to 221,000 m2, with an average of 140,000 m2 (Day 1982). 
Each ciudadela is surrounded by high walls with a single door that leads into a narrow corridor. 
These controlled access points lead to a wide plaza on the north end of the complex. These 
plazas were often encircled by benches and decorated with repetitive friezes. These plazas likely 
represent the deepest that non-elites could penetrate the ciudadela complexes. Two sectors to the 
south in the ciudadelas likely represent spaces for elite bargaining and royal residences, 
respectively. These are marked as elite spaces due to their restricted access and increasing 
proximity to the burial mound, located in the southeast corner (Day 1982).  
 Elite access to the ciudadelas was another matter entirely. After passing through the 
narrow entrance and wide plaza space, elite members of society could ascend a ramp to enter the 
central and northern sectors of the ciudadela. These sectors are distinguished by the presence of 
numerous storerooms as well as the audiencias. Audiencias were square rooms, open at one end, 
with niched walls and cane or reed roofs. These roofs were supported by large wooden posts that 
simultaneously served to aggrandize the open doorway (Day 1982).  
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Figure 3. Plan of Rivero Ciudadela. From Moore and Mackey 2008. 
While  the exact functions of audiencias is still a contested issue, it is clear that access to 
them was highly controlled. One interpretation views the audiencias as administrative ‘offices’ 
where bureaucratic negotiation took place. Supporters of this theory cite the spatial relationship 
between the audiencias and the storerooms (Keatinge and Conrad 1983). Others have critiqued 
this interpretation, claiming that the connection between audiencias and storerooms has been 
overstated (Moore 1996). Instead they argue for a religious interpretation of the audiencias. This 
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is supported by the presence of sub-floor dedicatory burials and by the analogous ceremonial use 
of wall niches elsewhere in the Andes. It’s possible that in reality the purpose of the audiencias 
fell somewhere in between the two extremes, coopting religious authority to legitimize political 
power. 
Chan Chan: Residential Structures  
 Residential structures at Chan Chan can be divided into two main categories: elite 
compounds and SIAR (small irregularly agglutinated rooms) (J Topic 1982). Like many pre-
industrial cities, Chan Chan is marked by a rigid division between an elite upper class (topped by 
royalty who lived inside the ciudadelas) and a larger working class. This division is reflected in 
residential structures.  
 Elite complexes are marked by features they share with ciudadelas, only at a smaller 
scale. Elite compounds are encircled by high walls with few entrances. They contain U-shaped 
structures similar to audiencias. Approximately one quarter of elite compounds contain 
storerooms (Klymyshyn 1982). Elite complexes also had priority access to water, with 28% of 
wells being associated with elite compounds while only 12% were associated with SIAR’s. This 
is significant due to Chan Chan’s desert location. Thus elite compounds can be defined by their 
enclosing walls, restricted entry, and access to water. While elite residences are marked by these 
dividing factors, they are not consistently spatially separated from the SIAR compounds. Rather, 
they are often proximal. 
 The SIAR can be divided into two main blocks: those on the outskirts at the southern and 
western edges of the city, and those associated with elite compounds in the center. Both types 
have been interpreted as combined living spaces and workshops for Chan Chan’s lower class. 
SIAR complexes associated with elite compounds have been interpreted as representing a 
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retainer relationship with the residences of the elite compounds. SIAR units of both kinds have 
been interpreted as housing for a sort of urban proletariat, who exchanged craft goods for access 
to wells and foodstuffs stored in the ciudadelas and elite compounds (J Topic 1982). While there 
was undoubtedly some variation in social status among SIAR residents, it seems clear that they 
were rigidly defined as being outside the nobility. Nevertheless, they engaged in reciprocal 
economic relationships with the nobility.  
 This reciprocal economic relationship is exemplified by the complementary residential 
pattern in urban Chan Chan. However, an increasing urban population at Chan Chan necessitated 
the acquisition of increased land and labor to maintain this economic system.  
The Chimú: Imperial Expansion 
 By 1200 CE, the Chimú had conquered their immediate area. In order to expand their 
resource pool the Chimú state needed to acquire more territory and/or improve their current 
territory.  With control of the Moche, Chicama and Viru valleys the immediate security of Chan 
Chan was assured. The Chimú administration then set to work improving this immediate area to 
increase its productivity.  
 This was primarily accomplished through the construction of vast irrigation networks. 
Often, many components of these irrigation systems were pre-existing and were revitalized by 
the Chimú. In the end, the Pre-Columbian extent of irrigated land in the Moche valley was at 
least 30% greater than the area sustained by modern irrigation practices (Moore and Mackey 
2008: 787). The Chimú also established satellite outposts that provided access to specific 
agricultural products. The site of Cerro la Virgen, for example, specialized in the production of 
cotton (Pozorski and Pozorski 1979). However, it soon became apparent that supporting the 
population of Chan Chan would require expanding the territorial control of the Chimú state.  
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 While the exact chronology of Chimú expansion is still debated, the process of expansion 
is generally agreed to have begun sometime in the 12th century and to have reached its apogee by 
the turn of the 15th century. Several competing theories of Chimú expansion exist, but Theresa 
Topic’s 1990 sequence is useful in its discussion of Chimú expansion up the course of the Moche 
River rather than north to south along the coast.  
 Topic (1990) describes this first phase from 900 to 1050 CE as being one of local 
consolidation. In this period, the Chimú extended their frontier to the lower edge of the 
chaupiyunga zone. At this juncture, a Chimú labor force constructed wall over 1km long as a 
frontier demarcation. Two fortified sites placed lower in the valley served as the muscle to 
enforce this territorial claim. Due to Cerro Cumbray’s location in the Sinsicap valley inland of 
this demarcation, it is likely the site was not yet occupied during this period. 
 Chimú expansion further inland took place during a second phase. Between 1130-1200 
CE the Chimú expanded their territorial control further inland, reaching into the Sinsicap and La 
Cuesta Valleys and consolidating control of the upper Moche. As the Chimú reached past the 
costa-chaupiyunga boundary into prime coca producing territory, they constructed fortresses to 
embody their claim to this valuable commodity (Topic 1990). They also constructed several 
fortifications along major roadways, perhaps in an attempt to control trade routes connecting 
coastal and highland communities (Boswell 2016). Cerro Cumbray’s situation in the lower 
chaupiyunga, and its location approximately 3km north of the Sinsicap-Moche juncture signal 
that the site most likely dates to this period at the earliest. The limited ceramic evidence noted 
during pedestrian survey would similarly place Cerro Cumbray in this mid to late Chimú period. 
This evidence is presented in Chapter Three. 
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 Further imperial expansion took place outside of the Moche Valley, but the timeline of 
this expansion has been a subject of debate. Topic (1990) argues for an initial phase of north-
south expansion that coincided with the consolidation of the upper Moche Valley, between 1130-
1200. Topic’s third phase, between 1300 and 1400, represents the final expansion of Chimú 
influence from Tumbes in the north to Chillon in the south. A new chronology proposed by 
Moore and Mackey (2008) agrees on the initial two phases, but proposes a date of 1320 for the 
first expansion outside the imperial heartland. Moore and Mackey also express doubts 
concerning the exact nature of imperial hegemony in the outlying provinces (Figure 4). They 
propose that areas north of Tucumé and south of the Casma valley “interacted with, but were not 
directly integrated into, the Chimú administrative hierarchy (Moore and Mackey 2008: 789).” 
 
 
Figure 4. A possible sequence of Chimú Expansion. From Moore and Mackey 2008. 
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While little evidence regarding Chimú strategy or military tactics is available, it is not a 
stretch to imagine that areas nearer to Chan Chan were more likely to have been conquered using 
direct force, while more distant areas were more likely to enter into a client state relationship. It’s 
also possible that like the Inka, the Chimú were prepared to accept cooperative populations 
nonviolently while exacting a heavy toll from populations that resisted. 
Ironically, the Chimú themselves would be violently conquered only a few generations 
later. The date for the fall of the Chimú empire is traditionally given as 1470. Ethnohistoric 
sources describe both an initial conquest by Topa Inka Yupanki, as well as a rebellion crushed by 
his son Huayna Capac (Rostworowski 1999: 78-89). While an ultimate battle likely spelled the 
end for the Chimú empire, Inka conquest of the north coast was a long and gradual process. In 
order to understand Chimú response to Inka expansion, it is therefore necessary to understand the 
formation and expansion of the Inka Empire. 
The Inka: Consolidation and Imperial Expansion 
 The Inka Empire would grow to become the largest land empire in South America prior 
to the Spanish Invasion. What began as a “moderately complex group of maize farmers” would 
grow into an imperial tour de force (Covey 2008: 812). Inka origin myths explained this meteoric 
rise to power as being due to divine blessing, the Inka royalty were sons of the sun. 
Archaeological evidence indicates only that by 1300 CE the Inka had dominion over Cusco and 
an area of 50-70km around it, with significant territorial campaigns beginning approximately 100 
years later (Covey 2008).  
 The leader credited with the transformation of the Inka state was Pachakuti, a son of the 
eighth king of a small Cusco polity. Pachakuti defeated the Inka’s biggest rivals, the Chankas, in 
a military upset that has since been mythologized. Following his victory Pachakuti had his 
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brother, the heir, executed for cowardice. He then seized political control (Gamboa 1532: 104-
106). It’s almost certain that Pachakuti did not defeat the Chankas single-handedly. These events 
may well represent a revisionist history designed to legitimize a violent coup. Whatever the case, 
these events made Pachacuti the sole leader of a kingdom primed to expand. So radical was the 
change that Pachacuti’s name can be translated either as the literal “earth shaker”, or the more 
profound “reformer of the world” (Cameron 1990, 58). By the end of his reign Pachacuti had 
subjugated much of the central Andean highlands. The conquests of the coast and the southern 
Andes were left to his son, Topa Inka Yupanki.  
 Topa Inka Yupanki expanded the Inka Empire by the greatest land area of any single 
ruler. He oversaw the conquest of the Inka’s greatest rivals, the Chimú (Moore and Mackey 
2008). He extended the empire’s reach north to Ecuador and south to northern Argentina. He’s 
also remarkable for his organizational efforts. By expanding the qhapaq ñan, the Inka royal 
highway, and organizing his subjects into a decimal bureaucracy he increased both agricultural 
productivity and military efficiency (Guaman Poma 1615: 141-161). While his tactical victories 
were impressive, it is these infrastructural developments which paved the way for further Inka 
conquest. They enabled Topa Inka Yupanki’s son, Huayna Capac, to continue his expansion. 
 Huayna Capac pushed the empire north and south. In the south, he moved deeper into 
modern Argentina and Chile. In the north he was determined to expand the Inka empire into 
modern day Colombia, though he was stalled by fortified local resistance (Guaman Poma 1615: 
182-185).  He also reconquered the Chimú and depopulated the city of Chan Chan, following a 
revolt against Inka authority (Rostworowski 1999: 89). These sorts of rebellions were not 
isolated events. Rather they were frequent but rarely successful. The Inka military system was in 
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fact designed to respond to this process of rebellion and reconquest, supported by an efficiently 
designed infrastructure system. 
The Inka: Tactics and Strategy 
 While Inka battle tactics have not been the subject of much in depth study, there are 
nevertheless some things that seem clear about how Inka commanders approached military 
engagements. Firstly, they preferred to avoid them. By massing troops at the border of an 
objective territory, Inka commanders tried to force local leaders to the negotiating table. If local 
elites submitted peacefully, they would be celebrated and in many cases maintain a significant 
level of agency (D’Altroy 1992; Ogburn 2014).  
If the Inka’s generous offer was refused, they relied on mass attacks by groups of 
conscript soldiers (Ogburn 2014). Many of these infantrymen were drawn from the provinces. 
Officers were typically either ethnically Inka or Inkas by privilege, an honor that could be 
bestowed as reward for loyalty or military achievement (Bram 1966: 47). The primary hand to 
hand weapons were maces, clubs, axes, and spears. At range, Inka forces employed the sling to 
great effect (Arkush and Tung 2013). Troops drawn from the eastern, Amazonian region of the 
Andes were particularly skilled in the use of the bow and arrow (Guaman Poma 1615: 120; Cobo  
1653: 215-220). (Figure 5) 
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Figure 5. An Inka Captain facing a jaguar, armed with a bow and arrow, in a wooded environment. From 
Guaman Poma de Ayala 1615: 120 
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Documentary evidence that the Inka military, especially under the command of Huayna 
Capac, also engaged in sieges (Guaman Poma 1615: 122; Gamboa 1532: 159-166). 
 
Figure 6. An Inka Captain engaged in a siege. Note the label of "pucara, fortaleza" as well as the 
description of the defenders as enemigas yungas. Guaman Poma de Ayala 1615: 122 
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Early written evidence also suggests that upon the conquest of a resistant population, the 
Inka were prepared to commit systematic executions as a form of reputation management. 
Recent bioarchaeological investigations have discovered suggestive evidence of the Inka 
massacre of a rebellious Chachapoyas population (Toyne and Vargas 2014).  
 On a strategic level, the Inka road system was designed for the rapid and well supplied 
movement of troops. The economic foundation of the Inka empire was a system of corvée labor 
known as the mita. Mita laborers could be conscripted into military service, or used to construct 
roads or work the fields (Murra 1980). During their period of service, mita laborers were 
provided food and clothing by the state (Murra 1980). Using this large labor force, the Inka were 
able to construct a massive highway network. Along the roads, the Inka constructed storehouses 
and way stations known as tambos, to supply military expeditions. These tambos were built at 
distances commensurate with the distance men and llama trains could travel in a day. Major 
centers were placed approximately one week apart and were stocked with surplus food and 
clothing (D’Altroy 1992). Messengers known as chaskis were employed to run great distances 
relay style. This allowed for the rapid transmission of military intelligence. Inka fortifications 
were unsurprisingly concentrated at the northern, southern, and eastern frontier (Covey 2008) 
(Figure 7). Fortifications of conquered populations may also have been reused.  
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Figure 7. Areas of concentrated Inka fortifications. From Covey 2008. 
This system of roads and supply depots allowed for rapid movement of troops both to defend the 
frontier as well as to quell rebellions. This system of provisioning and mobility allowed the Inka 
to ultimately conquer the Chimú. 
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Inka-Chimú Conflict  
 Perhaps anticipating eventual conflict with an expanding highland enemy, the Chimú 
heavily fortified their territory. Unfortunately, the Inka system of warfare discussed above 
enabled Inka forces to flank the Chimú, conquering local chiefdoms one by one until they 
reached Cajamarca. While the river valleys between Cajamarca had been fortified as a result of 
centuries long conflict between the Chimú and various small highland polities, they nevertheless 
represented the path of least resistance to Chan Chan. One account describes forces led on the 
ground by the brother of Inka Topa Yupanki, who disobeyed his brother’s orders not to advance 
in pursuit of a rebellious Chanca army. 
 Going after [the Chancas], [Capac Yupanqui] reached Cajamarca, crossing the 
borders that the Inca had instructed him not to pass. Although he remembered the orders 
of the Inca, he decided to conquer the province of Cajamarca, since he was already there, 
even though he did not have his brother's permission to do so. This province was densely 
populated and was rich in gold and silver, thanks to great cinchi1 named Guzmano Capac 
who lived there and who was a great tyrant who had robbed many provinces surrounding 
Cajamarca. As Capac Yupanqui entered the land of Cajamarca, Guzmano Capac learned 
of it. He prepared his men and called another cinchi, his tributary named Chimo Capac, 
the cinchi of the area where the city of Trujillo is now, on the coast of Peru. Combining 
their forces, they came in search of Capac Yupanqui, who defeated them with an ambush 
and other ruses that he placed for them. He routed and captured the two cinchis,  
Guzmano Capac and Chimo Capac, and acquired innumerable riches of gold and silver 
and other precious things, such as precious stones and red shells, which these natives then 
esteemed more than silver or gold. (Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa 1532, 134) 
 
 Interestingly, this account presents a pre-existing perhaps even tributary relationship 
between Guzmano’s highland kingdom and the Chimú leadership. This may also be a Spanish 
misunderstanding of the periodic raiding of the coast by highland populations in pursuit of “gold 
and silver”, represented as Guzmano Capac as having “robbed many provinces surrounding 
Cajamarca.” The Chimú may not have been true subjects, rather they may have been paying a 
nominal sum to highland groups to avoid violent incursions into their territory. 
                                               
1 Various names are used in the primary sources for Andean political or military leaders. Very early sources occasionally use the caribbean 
“cacique”. Kuraka and cinchi are Andean words, and are typically used by later sources.  
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Other accounts of the conquest portray an even more aggressive Inka strategy. They 
describe an attack that descended the Moche River with the goal of disrupting Chimú irrigation 
and laying siege to the city of Chan Chan by disrupting its food supply (Rostworowski 1999: 
78). While this is possible, it would have meant bypassing or subduing a number of fortresses 
between Cajamarca and Chan Chan. As a means of testing these theories, I present a number of 
possible invasion routes in Chapter 5. Each begins at a site that has archaeological or historical 
evidence of Inka presence, and ends at Chan Chan. Using GIS techniques, I explore the 














Chapter Three: A Fort by Any Other Name 
 Archaeologists working in the New World often feel a desire to make up for the mistakes 
of a colonial past by working to counter notions of Indigenous Americans as violent savages. 
However, this can have dangerous ramifications. Violence in prehistory was not an everyday 
occurrence, but neither was it uncommon. To insist otherwise is to infantilize indigenous peoples 
and to engage with the notion of the noble savage, an equally damaging stereotype.  
 In a 2007 article, Keeley, Fontana and Quick brought attention to this dilemma and in 
response discussed features of archaeological sites which are considered universally military in 
nature. Their stated goal was to “counter a long standing tendency of prehistoric archaeologists 
to dismiss or ignore the defensive functions and military significance of the large scale features 
they excavate and analyze” (Keeley et al. 2007: 56). The authors identified three specific 
characteristics of fortified sites: V-sectioned ditches, defended gates, and bastions (Keeley et al. 
2007: 55).  These three features are briefly discussed below. 
V sectioned ditches are especially telling of defensive site use for two main reasons. 
Firstly, they are not especially conducive to the flow of water, and thus would only limit an 
irrigation system. Secondly, their steep sides and narrow bottom are especially impeditive to 
attackers (Keeley et al. 2007: 58). The labor needed to construct these defenses ditches is in 
many cases less than would be expected. Surprisingly, the Romans (who one could consider 
something of an authority on earthwork fortifications) deemed a ditch only 1.5m wide by 1m 
deep to be sufficient defense in most circumstances. (Keeley et al. 2007: 61)  
Defended gates can be used both to repel attackers as well as to control entry and exit of 
civilians in peacetime. Keeley, Fontana and Quick do note, however, that heavily trafficked gates 
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can only be made so defendable before becoming an impediment to the everyday movement of 
individuals in and out of a settlement (Keeley et al. 2007, 62).  
Bastions effectively multiply the defender’s advantage, conferring additional height and 
cover and providing a platform from which to fire. Bastion spacing is therefore affected 
primarily by the maximum range of a culture’s primary defensive weapon. In the western Andes, 
the most widely used ranged weapon by far was the sling. The range of the sling’s effective 
firing range using different ammunition has been experimentally tested many times. Published 
results range from 27 m across flat ground to 110 m firing from an elevated position downhill 
(Keeley et al. 2007: 73). Vega and Craig found that untrained but fit male slingers had an 
average horizontal distance of 78 m with a maximum distance of 130 m (2009: 1267-1268). 
Obviously, a slingers range when firing downslope would be significantly greater. A slinger in a 
hilltop site was dangerous at a considerable range. 
Clearly, some features of archaeological sites can be definitively assigned a military 
function. Even so, this does not preclude a secondary or coincident symbolic function. Keeley, 
Fontana and Quick acknowledge that “fortifications have long been extremely powerful symbols 
pf possession, exclusion, independence, status, and political power.” (Keeley et al. 2007: 81) 
Some Andeanists, however, have posited a primarily ceremonial function for walled Andean 
hilltop sites. This is based on several lines of evidence, both archaeological and ethnohistoric.  
Archaeologically, critics of the hilltops as fortresses theory focus on four criteria that 
must be present to define a site as defensive. These are “(1) parapeted walls, (2) slingstones, (3) 
moats outside the walls, and (4) defensible location with restricted access” (Topic and Topic 
1987: 48). These criteria are difficult to assemble in full for many sites. A parapet is a raised 
ledge on the top of a wall which provides cover for defenders. Parapets on walls can fall over 
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time, especially in a seismically active zone such as Peru. Slingstones can, obviously, be moved. 
In cases where more angular stones were used as projectiles, they can be difficult to differentiate 
from piles of building materials. Moats can be filled with sediment, especially by the torrential 
El Niño rains which plague the north coast of Peru. A defensible location is a strong indicator, 
but judging defensibility is far from objective. This is troubling to many archaeologists who seek 
to quantify site data for scientific, comparative study. As such, these criteria in many ways seem 
destined to fail. 
Further complicating the discussion of Andean warfare is an Andean practice known as 
Tinku. Occuring to the present day, Tinku is a form of ceremonial combat in which different 
communities or kin groups engage in a sort of competitive violence. These fights often take place 
at a significant location between the two groups’ territories. The occasion is a festivity where 
there is drinking, dancing and music. There are often more spectators than participants (Arkush 
and Stannish 2005, 12). The winning group receives bragging rights, but not territory or tribute. 
In modern Tinku events, participants utilize weapons they associate with inka-ness: “slingshots, 
boleadors, clubs, and whips” (Arkush and Stannish 2005, 13). Nevertheless, serious injuries and 
even death still occur. Documented as far back as the early colonial period, the practice is now 
being curtailed by many Andean states. Some archaeologists have used ethnographic evidence of 
Tinku to argue that apparent warfare in  Andean prehistory was instead ritual or performative 
(Topic and Topic 1987). This approach has been criticized by others for ignoring the ritual 
component of all warfare, and for its tendency to pacify indigenous Andeans. 
A recent publication by Arkush and Stannish (2005) has pushed back against these ideas. 
They criticize both an overly strict definition of “fortification” as well as the way that many 
Andean archaeologists are “reluctant to conclude that the particular sites or cultures they studied 
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were involved in military conflict in prehistory” (Arkush and Stannish 2005, 3).  In terms of 
architecture Arkush and Stannish focus on explaining why some features other archaeologists 
have described as lacking in military capability could still be defensive in nature. These features 
include: incomplete walls, a lack of parapets, and a lack of water sources. 
Incomplete walls can largely be explained away as a result of Topic and Topic’s fourth 
principle of fortifications, defensible location. Rather than expending unnecessary labor creating 
artificial barriers, prehistoric peoples utilized and augmented existing natural features such as 
cliffs, ravines, and bodies of water. As Arkush and Stannish note, “the fact that Andean site walls 
from many different social contexts supplement natural defenses and block the routes of easiest 
access should be seen as evidence for defensive design, not against it” (2005, 8). 
A lack of parapets on walls would seem to limit them as platforms for defensive combat. 
However, they are not necessary. Parapets imply that an outside attacker would need to be 
engaged and prevented from reaching the wall. In many parts of the Andes and indeed in the 
Moche Valley, walls could still successfully be defended even without parapets for use as cover.  
Guaman Poma’s illustration of a pucara (Figure 6) shows defenders tossing stones down 
on an attacking force from a wall lacking parapets. Educated by Spanish missionaries, Guaman 
Poma was familiar with European military history and practice, as shown by many of his other 
illustrations. The fact that he would purposefully ignore parapets (or battlements in the European 
tradition) seems more unlikely than the alternative that many Andean fortified sites simply 
lacked parapets. 
A lack of internal water sources is often cited as reasoning behind dismissing a site’s 
military function. Castles and Fortresses in the old world were often designed around a spring or 
other water source, enabling the occupants to outlast during extended periods of siege. However, 
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this was only a consideration in cultural contexts which emphasized protracted siege warfare. In 
the Andes, the Inka Empire was perhaps the first polity with a logistical system capable of 
supplying troops over long distances (D’Altroy 2002; Arkush and Stannish 2005). Thus, siege 
with the goal of starving the enemy out was a relatively late development in Andean warfare. In 
the Moche valley, many fortifications were originally developed to counter incursive raiding by 
highland groups (Patrick Mullins, personal communication, 2019). As such, they could have 
served as temporary refuges in times of danger without the need for extensive supply caches 
(Arkush and Stannish 2005). The Inka emerged as the first existential threat with the capability 
to engage in long term campaigning on the north coast. As such, a fortification system that had 
been designed for a very different sort of threat was tested in a new military environment. One 
small component of this fortification system was located on a non-descript hilltop a short 











Chapter 4: MV-323 - Cerro Cumbray 
Identification and Selection 
 The site considered here was originally identified from Brian Billman’s 1990-91 
pedestrian survey of the Moche Valley. MV-323, hereafter referred to as Cerro Cumbray, was 
selected for the presence of both coastal and highland ceramics dating to the Late Intermediate 
Period (Billman 1996). This was interpreted as a sign that the site was relatively close to the 
highland-coastal frontier. As the focus of the project was on highland-coastal conflict, Cerro 
Cumbray presented a significant opportunity. Also contributing to the selection of the site for 
study was its preservation. Many hilltop sites in the Moche valley have been looted in the search 
for precious metals and prehistoric ceramics for the art market. While Cerro Cumbray does show 
signs of exploratory looting between PD’s 010-012 and 018-019, the relatively small size of the 
site seems to have made it unattractive to looters. The area of the entire site can be estimated at 
1.6 hectares.  
Cerro Cumbray – Pedestrian Survey 
  The pedestrian survey of Cerro Cumbray took place over two field days. Over those two 
days, fifty one PD’s (provenience designations) were documented, each a 1m2 circle. One PD 
(033) was excluded due to GPS error. One PD (001) was used as a proof of concept and later 
found to be outside the LIP area of the site. Points were taken in 5–10 m intervals along the 
natural contour of the site. While straight transects would possibly have resulted in more 
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complete survey data, they were not feasible given the number of sheer cliff faces in the survey 
area. All surface artifact data was documented in the field. 
A standard data collection form was used in the field. UTM and elevation were taken 
using a Garmin 62stc GPS.  
 
 
For artifact data, four main groups were used: ceramic material, lithic material, 
faunal/human Remains, and additional material. Ceramics were subdivided into: body, 
diagnostic, and waster sherds. Five ceramic styles were identified from diagnostic sherds: coastal 
blackware, coastal redware, highland, Salinar, and unidentified(Strong and Evans 1952; Collier 
1955). Three main vessel forms   were identified based on Keatinge’s seriation of Chimú 
ceramics (1973): jars/ollas, urns, and plates. Jars are constricted forms with tall necks, and are 
used primarily for temporary liquid storage. Ollas are less constricted forms which are used 
Figure 8. The distribution of PD’s or surface survey points at Cerro Cumbray. 
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primarily for cooking, but can be used for storage. 2  Urns are large vessels used principally for 
water or chicha storage. Plates are flat forms used as serving vessels. These categories are basic, 
but were easy and expedient to judge in the field with unwashed and eroded sherds. When 
possible some rim forms were specifically documented as “C Rim”, a distinctive Chimú recurved 
rim form dating to the mid to late Chimú period (Cutright 2009: 234-259). Others were noted for 
Chimú stylistic design elements such as: “piel de ganzo”, a mold impressed bumpy surface 
compared to goosebumps, or mold impressed/applique designs (Keatinge 1973).  While more 
specific identifications would’ve been possible in a laboratory setting, the resulting data from 
field identification was sufficient for the purposes of this study. 
Lithics were divided into: cores, debitage (shatter), hammer stone, sling stone, ground 
stone, hoe/digging implement, and flake. Faunal/ human Remains were divided into: marine 
shell, human crania, long bones, and other. Additional material included any artifact not 
encompassed by the previous three categories. Each data collection form also recorded 
information concerning preservation and integrity and a photo log for photos of diagnostic sherds 
or architectural features associated with each survey point. 
Cerro Cumbray – Drone Based Photogrammetry 
 In order to provide an orthophoto and DEM for analysis, a DJI Phantom 4 drone was 
used to aerially photograph the entire site and surrounding hillsides. The Phantom 4 provides an 
optimal platform for this application due to its integrated camera and GPS systems, as well as its 
relatively long battery life. In addition to the drone, an Iphone 6 and DJI GO 4 were used to 
manually pilot the drone and trigger photographs. Photographs were taken at an altitude of 15m 
above the summit with an overlap of approximately 50%. This overlap was manually increased 
                                               
2 These two categories were combined in the field and were intended to be separated using diagnostic sherd 
photographs. The loss of these photographs limits the data’s utility somewhat. 
 39 
to compensate for the steep inclines on either side of the summit area.  While an increased 
overlap may have improved fine-scale resolution, flight time was limited by both battery and 
atmospheric conditions. 
  
Figure 9. The Author piloting the Phantom 4 drone from the summit of Cerro Cumbray. 
Much like fine-scale photogrammetry of artifacts, drone photogrammetry methods benefit 
greatly from flat overhead light. The best flight times are thus shortly before and after noon.  
Flight opportunities are also limited by the thick coastal fog which often characterizes 
mornings in the Moche Valley. Moisture in the air can reach levels which damage cameras and 
produce foggy or fuzzy photographs. (Patrick Mullins, personal communication, 2019). As the 
Phantom 4 unit used in the survey was both “brand new” and “really expensive” I sought to 
avoid exposure to adverse conditions whenever possible (Brian Billman, personal 
communication, 2019).   
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A total of 489 photographs representing 2.74GB of data were taken over the course of 
two days. Agisoft Photoscan was used to align the photos and construct a 3D model of the site. 
From this 3d model, Photoscan was used to generate a geolocated orthophoto and DEM from this 
3D model in .tif format. These files were imported into QGIS for initial proofing and ArcPro for 
more rigorous analysis. The creation of an orthophoto allows for true comparisons between 
architectural features because orthophotos present accurate distances. The DEM is used for 
viewshed analysis as well as to produce a number of other raster layers. One of the most 
productive layers was a hillshade produced from the DEM. The use of artificially enhanced 
lighting made visible a number of ditches and several terraces not visible in the original 
photographs.  
Cerro Cumbray – Survey Results 
 Located a short walk up the ridge from the Momdern hamlet of Cumbray, Cerro 
Cumbray has only one viable approach. Low down, it involves negotiating a steep scree covered 
slope and often falling into single file as the ridge narrows and expands. Nevertheless, the east 
facing slopes of the low ridge was terraced and prehistorically occupied. While no systematic 
survey was conducted lower on the approach due to time constraints, Brian Billman’s 1990–1 
field notes and my own observations of surface ceramics would guardedly date the lower 
occupation earlier than the LIP.  
 As the ridgeline steepens and approaches the summit, it again narrows. It was at this 
point that we discovered a well-preserved gate. The gate was situated on the most level approach 
to the upper site, presumably because it was the easiest everyday access. Small foundations flank 
the gate to the side as well as to the interior, signaling the continued path up. The location of the 
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gate immediately between two steep slopes would have made it easy to augment the site’s 
natural defenses. Past this gate, the Chimú occupation of the site is readily apparent. 
 
Figures 10 and 11. The Cerro Cumbray Gate from Below and Above. The individual on the right, Robby 
Valderrama, is 1.6m tall. The author, on the right, is 1.8m tall. 
 Excluding areas below the entrance gate, the site can be divided into four main sectors. 
They are, in order of increasing distance from the south gate: (1) the approach, (2) the summit 
area, (3) the bastion, (4) the lower occupation area. The results of pedestrian survey above the 




Figure 12. The division of the site into different sectors based on topography and artifact data. 
 
 Sector 1 is a relatively narrow section of the ridge, though not quite as narrow as the gate 
passage. As it approaches the summit, it becomes broader and less steep. From the samples taken 
(022–032), the ceramic density is low at an average of 4.9 sherds/m2. This average is also 
artificially rather high, given the inclusion of sherds redeposited from higher ground at PD-028. 
This was noted as a flat catchment area below an actively eroding surface and contained 24 total 
sherds. If PD-028 is excluded, the average falls to 3 sherds/m2. Three diagnostic sherds were 
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discovered in Sector 1: one coastal blackware, one coastal redware, and one Salinar. Only one 
sherd was large enough to indicate form, representing a blackware jar.  








Highland Salinar Unidentified Total 
Jar/Olla 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Urn 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Plate 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unknown 0 0 0 1 0 1 
C-Rim 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PdG 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Mold/App 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 1 1 0 1 0 3 
 
No lithic artifacts or ecofacts were documented in this zone. Shortly past the entrance 
gate, the remainder of a substantial wall was documented immediately downhill of PD-031.  
 As the approach flattens near the top of the hill, the transition is both immediate and 
remarkable. This marks Sector 2, the summit area. This area is marked by a significantly higher 
ceramic density, averaged from PD’s 008–021. The average for this sector is 18.2 sherds/m2. 
Twenty nine diagnostic sherds were identified, of which 16 were coastal blackwares, 10 were 
coastal redwares, 1 was highland and 2 were unidentified. Of the diagnostic sherds, the majority 
of coastal wares were jars/ollas (18) with a small cluster of urns (3). Several pieces of coastal 
ware were further identifiable as C rims (1) or Piel de Ganzo (2). The only face motif sherd 
found during the survey was a piece of coastal blackware located at PD-019. The single highland 
diagnostic sherd was identified as a plate.  
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The eastern edge of Sector 2 also shows the highest concentration of lithic artifacts 
anywhere on the site, seconded by a lighter concentration in the upper area of Sector 4. All of the 












Evidence of scattered broken marine shell was found at PD’s 009, 012, 020. The only 









Highland Salinar Unidentified Total 
Jar/Olla 7 11 0 0 0 18 
Urn 3 0 0 0 0 3 
Plate 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Unknown 0 0 0 1 1 2 
C-Rim 0 1 0 0 0 1 
PdG 0 2 0 0 0 2 
Mold/App 0 2 0 0 0 2 
Total 10 16 1 1 1 29 
Figure 13. Total distribution of lithics per square meter, by PD. 
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Figure 14. Marine shell found at Cerro Cumbray. A value of 0.5 indicates the presence of broken shell, a 
value of 1 indicates an intact shell. 
 Sector 3 is located to the west of the Sector 2 down the western ridge. Sector 3 is defined 
by the PD’s from 002–007. While not as low as Sector 1, ceramic densities in Sector 3 are 
significantly lower than Sector 2. Based on an average of PD’s 002–007 the ceramic density of 
Sector 3 is approximately 8.7 sherds/m2. Four diagnostic sherds were found in Sector 3, all 
coastal blackware. One was identified as a C rim. While no highland diagnostic sherds were 
found, 14 body sherds at PD-006 were noted as possibly highland due to their overall brown 
color, the inclusion of lustrous micaceous minerals, and the overall small size of inclusions. Due 







Table 3. Diagnostic Sherds from Sector 3. 
 
The most significant area of Sector 3 is the western edge, which represents the most 
fortified area of the site. At this boundary, a natural ditch has been enhanced by the construction 
of two stone walls (Figure 15). It is unclear whether the ditch was excavated prehistorically to 
increase its military function. A prehistoric earthwork lended cover to defenders above without 
being a true parapet. There is also evidence of an eroded v-shaped ditch between PD-004 and 








Highland Salinar Unidentified Total 
Jar/Olla 0 3 0 0 0 3 
Urn 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Plate 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unknown 0 0 0 0 0 0 
C-Rim 0 1 0 0 0 1 
PdG 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mold/App 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 0 4 0 0 0 4 
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 Figure 15. The bastion at the western end of Sector 3 under normal light. Green lines represent the 
approximate upper and lower bounds of a defensive earthwork, 
 
 
Figure 16. The bastion at the western end of Sector 3 under hillshading. Green lines represent the 
approximate upper and lower bounds of a defensive earthwork, 
 
Two of the three slingstones documented at Cerro Cumbray were also found in Sector 3 
at PD-002. No other lithic artifacts or ecofacts were found in this sector. The steep ditch west of 
PD-002 limited further survey in the interest of safety. By retracing the ridge from Sector 3 back 
up to Sector 2, and descending via the northern ridge, we enter Sector 4 of the site. 
 48 
 Sector 4 is defined by a high ceramic density and evidence of significant prehistoric 
terracing. PD’s 034–053 define the limits of Sector 4, but it’s likely that PD’s 034-040 represent 
either a less dense occupation than the upper areas of Sector 4 or erosion deposits from terraces 
higher on the face. As such, a distinction is drawn between the lower and higher areas of Sector 4 
in the site map. The average ceramic density between PD’s 034–053 was 16.8 sherds/m2. 
Considering only PD’s 41–53 yields an average of 23.8 sherds/m2. 29 diagnostic sherds were 
identified:, 13 coastal blackware, 10 coastal redware, three highland, and three unidentified. All 
of the coastal wares were identified as jars/ollas apart from two red, coarsely tempered urn 
sherds identified at PD-053. Both highland sherds were identified as plates, one a coarse 
earthenware (PD-041) and one a painted thin walled vessel (PD-049). Among the more unusual 
finds was a small blackware applique hand (PD-048).  
Table 4. Diagnostic Sherds from Sector 4. 




Highland Salinar Unidentified Total 
Jar/Olla 6 8 0 0 0 14 
Urn 2 0 0 0 0 2 
Plate 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Unknown 1 0 1 0 0 2 
C-Rim 0 2 0 0 0 2 
PdG 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Mold/App 0 2 0 0 2 4 
Painted 1 0 1 0 1 3 
Total 10 13 3 0 3 29 
 
 From the ridge that comprises Sector 4, a number of walls and terraces were visible on 
the northeastern slope of the hill above the river valley. Erosion, site degradation, and steep 
topography made these areas difficult to access, and they were not surveyed.  
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Cerro Cumbray – Basic Interpretations 
Per the ceramic, lithic, and biological evidence, four distinct areas can be identified at the 
site corresponding with the four sectors identified above. Sector 1, the approach, has a low 
artifact density. As such, it likely represents the entrance path to the site, but little more than that.  
Sector 2, the summit area, can be described best as a general work and food preparation 
area. The lithic evidence speaks to the use of an open and flat space in the preparation of stone 
tools. Food preparation is evidenced by the presence of marine shell including the single 
identifiable instance of Donex Peruvianus. The concentration of urns near the summit may also 
signal the storage of water in this area. This would be necessary given the site’s lack of internal 
water source. During times of conflict, the flat and highly visible nature of this area would also 
make it an ideal signaling platform.  
Sector 3, the bastion, is largely defensive in nature. While the gate and wall complex near 
PD-031 defended the most likely approach, Sector 3 defended the rear. This is evidenced both by 
the presence of slingstones and the walls and earthworks by PD-002. The ditch between PD-004 
and 005 may represent a backup fortification or fall back defensive line. This is the strongest 
evidence for intentional fortification at Cumbray.  
Sector 4, with a high ceramic density and a sequence of terraces, likely represents the 
site’s main occupational area. Most of the forms present (jars/ollas) are constricted and related to 
liquid storage or cooking. The terraces visible from Sector 4 on the northeast face likely 
represent additional residential terraces, and would be a promising area for future investigation.  
 This evidence overall speaks to a site that was situated in a naturally defendable setting 
and over time, lightly fortified and sparsely occupied. It was not a fortified military outpost, able 
to withstand extensive attacks. However, neither was it a defenseless hamlet. Cerro Cumbray can 
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best be interpreted as a refuge site, one that was occupied more during times of conflict, and 
more lightly during less tumultuous periods. The use of the site as a periodic refuge would help 
explain the large number of storage or constricted cooking vessels present in the diagnostic 
dataset. The presence of blackware C Rims date the site to the Middle or Late Chimú phases, a 
time of heightened tension between the coast and highlands (Toohey 2016). If ceramics are taken 
to reflect the origin of the resident population, the site was overwhelmingly coastal. The presence 
of a few highland sherds, though, does speak to a frontier that was at least somewhat porous. The 
very limited set of highland diagnostic sherds would seem to indicate that, at Cerro Cumbray, 
highland wares were present mostly as serving vessels. However, the limited sample size makes 
this little more than conjecture.  
 In order to truly understand the role that Cumbray played however, its necessary to move 
beyond the bounds of the site itself. A more full understanding of the world in which the site’s 










Chapter 5: A View to Kill 
 The advent of widely available and user-friendly GIS software has made viewshed 
analysis a popular technique, both in the Andes and further afield. While viewshed techniques 
can be adapted to nearly any context, this analysis focuses on surveillance and security. This 
trend in Andean archaeology was invigorated by the work of Elizabeth Arkush, who used 
intervisibility as a means to examine the role of fortified sites in the Titicaca Basin (Arkush 
2011). Patrick Mullins’ 2016 work focuses on the intervisibilty of a number of Moche Valley 
LIP fortified sites (Mullins 2017). My paper deals with a similar subject matter, but is instead 
focused on the visibility of three hypothetical invasion routes from Cerro Cumbray. Using this 
data, the role of Cerro Cumbray in the overall Chimú defensive network can be examined.  
GIS Analysis - Selection and Considerations 
 Five sites are involved in the Viewshed analysis hereafter presented. They are Chan 
Chan, Cerro Cumbray, Cerro Ramon, Rogoday, and Guzmango. Each was chosen for a certain 
role. Chan Chan, as the Chimú capital, was likely the ultimate goal of Inka conquest. As such, it 
represents the destination point of all GIS functions discussed in this chapter. Cerro Cumbray 
serves as the center of the viewshed polygons, and the PD’s shown in Figure 8 are used as the 
observer points for the visibility analysis conducted here. Guzmango, Cerro Ramon, and 
Rogoday serve as three hypothetical starting points for a highland based invasion of Chan Chan. 
Three possible invasion routes are modeled using a least-cost path function. The visibility of 
each route was then calculated as a percentage of the least-cost path that falls within a viewshed 
polygon centered at Cerro Cumbray. In order to account for different weather and light 
conditions, three viewshed distances were used in the analysis. 
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Guzmango, Cerro Ramon, and Rogoday 
 Guzmango is the furthest of the three sites from Chan Chan, and the closest to 
Cajamarca. Rather than archaeological evidence, the selection of the site is based on Guzmango 
as a toponym. From Pedro Sarmiento Gamboa, we know that the leader of the highland group 
subdued by Topa Inka Yupanki was “guzmano capac” (Gamboa 1532: 134). “Guzmano” 
represents the name of a local group or individual leader. “Capac” is an honorific frequently used 
in the names of political elites and military leaders, such as Huayna Capac. Other 
hispanicizations list his name as Guzmango (Rostworowski 1999). This discrepancy is not 
troubling, given the variability of Quechua names written into the Spanish alphabet by early 
chroniclers. The modern village of Guzmango is located in the district of Cajamarca. While this 
could easily be a coincidence, linguistic study has shown that Andean toponyms often have a 
surprising durability (Torero 1989). While not an exact location, the town of Guzmango thus 
provides one approximate starting point for one possible Inka advance into Chimú territory.  
The site of Cerro Ramon lies on a prehistoric roadway connecting the Sinsicap river 
valley and to the highlands (Boswell 2016). While the only hard evidence of Inka occupation 
was found at the nearby site of Cerro Huancha, if one site had been conquered and incorporated 
into the Inka system the other site would have been as well (Boswell 2016: 207–209). Cerro 
Ramon was chosen for a starting point because of its proximity to a well-developed road leading 
into the highlands that would have facilitated the rapid movement of troops. The well-defined 
path leading past Cerro Ramon would have been utilized by highland raiding parties prior to the 
Inka incursion.  
 The site of Rogoday is perhaps the best case for Inka occupation evidenced by material 
culture (Coupland 1979). It is the largest and in a chain of hilltop sites located near the modern 
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village of Huacaday, to the northeast of Cerro Ramon. It was investigated by Coupland (1979) 
who suggested that Rogoday was a significant Inka stopping point on their road network 
descending to the coast. Coupland identified only Late Horizon ceramics at the site, consistent 
with the idea of the Inka constructing a new site and perhaps resettling local individuals to 
provide the labor (Coupland 1979: 93–94). Also supporting this theory is the discrepancy 
between Rogoday’s large and intensely terraced agricultural fields and its relatively small 
population (Coupland 1979: 87–93). This may represent the Inka model of storing agricultural 
surplus in state controlled areas for support of corvee laborers and troops, with the terraced fields 
worked by state laborers to produce the agricultural surplus that supported the army. 
Discrepancies between Coupland’s maps and modern satellite imagery made it difficult 
to identify sites named in Coupland’s 1979 thesis. Rogoday corresponds to the largest walled 














Figure 17. A large-scale view of the viewsheds from Cerro Cumbray and 

























Figure 18. A small-scale view of the viewsheds from Cerro Cumbray and 
the least cost paths discussed in this chapter. Scale – 1:150,00 
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Spatial Analysis - Modeling Terrain and Viewshed 
In order to model a possible invasion path from each of the three highland start points to 
Chan Chan, a number of spatial analysis tools were used in ArcPro. Firstly, the terrain of the 
survey area was modeled using a Digital Elevation Model (DEM) obtained from the Peruvian 
Ministry of the Environment. 
(http://geoservidorperu.minam.gob.pe/geoservidor/download_raster.aspx) 
  The DEM originates from NASA’s ASTER GDEM (Advanced Spaceborne Thermal 
Emission and Reflection Radiometer Global Digital Elevation Model) project and has a 
resolution of 30 m. Several ASTER tiles were compiled into a composite DEM, and the survey 
area was extracted using a polygon mask to reduce the processing power needed for calculation. 
Next, a slope raster was derived from the survey area DEM, expressed in degrees rather 
than percent slope. This slope raster was reclassified into 11 classes, using the natural breaks 












Figures 19 and 20. Comparison of slope raster before and after reclassification. 
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Utilizing this reclassified slope raster, a cost backlink and cost distance raster were 
generated for each of the highland sites. Cost distance indicates magnitude of cost while cost 
backlink indicates directionality. A combination of these two rasters can then be used to generate 
a least-cost path from the origin to a target point. In this case, the target of each path was a point 
in the central sector of Chan Chan. The least-cost path was generated as a polyline feature in 
order to facilitate vector intersection as a mode of analysis. In order to prevent a single pixel or 
DEM data error from unintentionally obscuring a large segment of the line feature, each least 
cost path was re-rended as a polygon based on a 10-m buffer from the original line. This 10-m 
buffer more realistically reflects a group of people on the move as compared to a single pixel 
wide line. 
 
Figures 21 and 22. The cost distance (left) and cost backlink (right) rasters for Cerro Ramon. Note the 
increasingly red color gradient in Figure 21 as cost increases with distance. The myriad colors in Figure 22 
represent least-cost direction as one of the eight Cardinal (N, E, S, W) or Primary Intercardinal directions 
(NE, NW, SE, SW). 
 
 Next, three viewshed polygons were generated using the PD points from Cerro Cumbray 
as observer points (Figure 8). Observer height was set at 1.6 m, the average for a modern 
Peruvian adult (Wikipedia 2019). The three viewsheds are each based on a specific scenario. The 
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nearest viewshed, at 3-km, represents the distance at which an individual with perfect vision can 
distinguish a human sized object (Wolchover 2012). This polygon is displayed in lime green. 
The intermediate viewshed, at 12-km, represents the distance at which moisture or other 
particulate matter in the air would obscure distant objects (Wolchover 2012). This polygon is 
displayed in yellow. The largest viewshed, at 48-km, represents the approximate distance an 
individual with perfect vision could identify the brightness of a candle under perfect light and air 
quality conditions (Wolchover 2012). This polygon is displayed in bright red. (Figure 17)  
 As a final step, each of the aforementioned 10-m least-cost path buffer polygons was 
intersected with the 3, 12, and 48-km viewshed polygons. The total area of each case’s 
intersection or overlap was recorded to allow for comparison to the total area. 
Results 
 The results of this analysis are presented in Table 5. As the large numbers make the data 
difficult to intuitively analyze, Table 6 presents the same data in percentage format. 
Table 5. Area of 10 m buffer polygons which intersect viewshed polygon at 3, 12, and 48 km distance. 




Total Area of 10-m 











Guzmango 1,828,091 0 0 0 
Ramon 907,358 88,681 167,547 196,132 
Rogoday 1,175,455 68,831 86,063 131,793 
Table 6. Area of 10 m buffer polygons which intersect viewshed polygon at 3, 12, and 48 km distance by 
% of total. 
Least Cost Path 
Source 
Visibility at 3-km  
Intersect 
Visibility at 12-km 
Intersect 
Visibility at 48-km 
Intersect 
Guzmango 0% 0% 0% 
Ramon 9.8% 18.5% 21.6% 
Rogoday 5.9% 7.3% 11.2% 
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 A number of patterns are present in the data. The route from Guzmango is not visible 
from Cerro Cumbray at any of the three distances. This is not surprising, given that the least cost 
path from Guzmango to Chan Chan descends the Chicama Valley before turning south in the 
coastal plain. Paths from Cerro Ramon and Rogoday are visible from Cerro Cumbray. The path 
from Cerro Ramon descends the Sinsicap valley in the immediate view of Cerro Cumbray, and 
as such exhibits the highest degree of visibility. Although the path from Rogoday descends 
through the neighboring upper Moche Valley, it is still visible in specific spots. A force 
descending from either site with the goal of reaching Chan Chan via the easiest route would have 
had to pass into Cerro Cumbray’s 3-km viewshed before continuing. 
 Least cost paths are only one option, they don’t take into account human agency and are 
merely used here for the purposes of exploratory analysis. Nevertheless, these results support the 
logical conclusion that residents of Cerro Cumbray could have monitored a route down from 
Cerro Ramon, through the Sinsicap Valley. This fits with the idea of the site being designed 
primarily as a refuge from seasonal raiders, who likely would have descended the main road 
from the highlands. While the route from Rogoday is significantly less visible, a large army 
would likely have been visible from Cerro Cumbray, especially by the light of their cooking fires 
at night. 
Cumbray’s Place in a Network 
 It is also important to recognize that Cerro Cumbray was but one very small spoke in a 
Chimú network that extended further up and down the valley (Mullins 2016). Cumbray has a 
limited viewshed, but it upon seing danger residents could have signaled warnings to more 
centrally visible settlements. This could have been done in the form of message runners or signal 
fires, which would have been visible from many of the surrounding hilltop sites. Neighboring 
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sites may also have represented fallback points, a place Cumbray’s residents could retreat to 
when their own defenses seemed insufficient. There are a number of larger LIP sites within the 
immediate area. Mullins (2016) article examined the visibility relationships between these sites 
and concluded that they were intentionally placed for visibility. The notion of Cerro Cumbray as 
a location designed to aggregate and deliver information to larger, more well defended sites is a 
reasonable inference given the GIS analysis presented here. Further analysis regarding the role of 
Cerro Cumbray and a number of other small LIP sites in the Moche and Sinsicap Valleys would 
help establish this sites function while furthering our understanding of the role that larger sites 













Chapter Six: Conclusions 
 In the late 15th century, two empires collided on the north coast of Peru. The highland-
based Inka came down the river valleys on the western slopes of the Andes, determined to 
subdue their largest remaining rival, the Chimú. Each side employed a different strategy. For the 
Inka, rapid, well-supplied troop movement required the construction of road infrastructure and a 
state controlled economic system designed to extract agricultural goods for the logistical support 
of armies on the march. For the Chimú, a system of labor conscription and reciprocal 
redistribution was likely used in the construction of a series of hilltop sites designed for defense 
in depth. These sites relied on view for defense, so that highland raiding parties and later foreign 
armies could be met with Chimú force.  
 Caught in the middle of this conflict was the small site of Cerro Cumbray. As previously 
discussed, Cerro Cumbray was not designed to withstand sustained assaults. It was vulnerable to 
siege given its lack of internal water sources. However, neither was it a completely defenseless 
village, woefully unprepared for the violence of its time. The site was inhabited by a small group 
who likely farmed fields in the valley below and returned to site for security in times of conflict. 
Ceramic evidence tentatively dates the site to the Middle to Late Chimú phases, a tumultuous 
time marked by increased conflict. The high numbers of food and water storage vessels seem to 
indicate a preoccupation with keeping supplied in the case of raiders attacking. The population of 
Cerro Cumbray lived in an insecure world.  
While the site lacks the parapeted walls and internal water sources that would make it 
truly hardened, a concern with security is nevertheless evident in the gate and wall construction 
defending the approach to the site. Likewise, the slingstones and defensive architecture seen in 
Sector 3 represent an effort to fortify the remaining approach. The site’s overall location on a 
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hilltop meant that natural cliffs were the main defensive feature, and substantial architectural 
investment wasn’t necessary. The site’s residential area is understandably positioned with the 
Sector 3 bastion on one side, the gate and walls of Sector 1 on the other, and steep cliffs to the 
front and back. 
A further emphasis on security can be seen in the site’s viewshed. The site was focused 
on the approach down the Sinsicap valley from Cerro Ramon, likely anticipating occasional 
raiding parties descending from the highlands. As the existential threat of the Inka appeared, it’s 
likely that the site continued to be occupied in order to monitor the progress of an approaching 
army. From Cerro Cumbray, an observer could monitor a large proportion of the path from Cerro 
Ramon as well as small pieces of the approach from Rogoday. This information was likely 
filtered back to larger, more well-fortified settlements further down the Moche Valley. As such, 
Cerro Cumbray represents not only a local refuge but a small lookout point in the larger Chimú 
defensive network. The analysis presented herein supports this refuge and signaling function, but 
the data used for this analysis was limited. By considering the limitations of this study, we can 
evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of this project as well as plan more thoroughly for future 
projects.  
Reflections and Future Research 
As stated in the Preface, the field season of summer 2019 was cut short by illness and 
time constraints. This combined with the steep slopes on either side of Cerro Cumbray’s main 
ridgeline limited pedestrian survey to the tops of the ridge. Diagnostic sherds had to be 
expediently identified in the field, and the skill of the author likely influenced these 
identifications, especially in the case of some highland and Salinar styles which are difficult to 
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distinguish by surface color. The digitization of rim profiles from field photographs is ongoing, 
and may help more specifically identify the spatial distribution of certain forms. 
Aerial photography helped clarify the function of several areas of the site, such as in 
Figures 15 and 16. However, it could be further integrated into the spatial analysis presented in 
Chapter 5. The finer resolution of the DEM produced from aerial photogrammetry may have 
yielded slightly more accurate results than the ASTER GDEM data. Likewise, the integration of 
Tobler’s hiking function could more accurately model pedestrian traffic in the least-cost model 
discussed in Chapter 5. Nevertheless, the least-cost paths and viewsheds presented in Chapter 5 
present a useful baseline for analysis, and they are sufficiently accurate for the purposes of 
distinguishing the three least-cost path polygons. However, more accurate models of both 
viewsheds as well as possible paths would be useful in analyzing patterns among many of the 
smaller sites in the Moche Valley. 
The research potential of these small sites, like Cerro Cumbray, is considerable. Many 
sites in the Moche valley are too small to be worth excavating or investigating individually in 
depth. However, taken as an aggregate, a database of these small sites could be analyzed using 
modern GIS techniques. GIS based research into the role of Cerro Cumbray and other small sites 
within the larger Chimú defensive network would deepen our understanding of the degree to 
which the Chimú positioned sites with viewsheds of strategic paths in mind. This would expand 
on previous discussion of Moche Valley visibility by including sites without so called “defensive 
features” (Mullins 2016: 349). By examining Mullins’ and Billman’s surveys of the Moche 
Valley, future researchers could apply this idea of viewshed-path interaction to a larger dataset of 
these seemingly trivial small sites. This work could even be done remotely, reducing the need for 
students to fund costly international travel to engage in independent research. 
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A larger dataset would also allow for investigations of landscape permeability. This 
concept has recently gained traction in discussions of species movement by wildlife biologists, 
but it could be modified to examine the mobility of  prehistoric human groups using GIScience. 
Currently a complex analysis requiring a high degree of technical competence, it is likely that 
methods of examining landscape permeability will become more accessible in the near future. 
The value of studying these small sites is not in a singular, blockbuster publication. 
Rather, it is materialized in many small steps forward. The value becomes apparent as 
opportunities to learn and develop techniques emerge, and fanciful ideas are tempered by the 
harsh realities of fieldwork and real world archaeology. Nevertheless, future studies of the Late 
Intermediate Period Moche Valley will improve our understanding of the areas prehistory as they 
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